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VARIATIONS ON KAK’S THREE STAGE QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPHY PROTOCOL
JAMES HAROLD THOMAS
Abstract. This paper introduces a variation on Kak’s three-stage quanutm
key distribution protocol which allows for defence against the man in the mid-
dle attack. In addition, we introduce a new protocol, which also offers similar
resiliance against such an attack.
1. Introduction
In the relatively new field of quantum information science, there have been lim-
ited numbers of true breakthroughs. The quantum computer remains a machine on
paper only, for a working realization has proved elusive. For one of the most pow-
erful tools that the quantum computer would provide, namely the reduction of the
factorization problem to polynomial time by Shor’s algorithm, the most successful
implementation to date has been to factor the number 15 into 3 times 5 [1].
The quantum computer might remain unrealized for years to come. Indeed, Kak
has suggested that the current quantum circuit model for quantum computers is
fundamentally flawed and new models must be developed to tackle the problem [2].
While there have been limited strides in some areas of quantum information
science, one area in particular has produced realizable solutions in the field of cryp-
tography. Quantum key distribution protocols have been successfully implemented
and have produced commercially available products.
In this paper, we will discuss a new protocol proposed by Kak called the “Three
Stage Protocol.” To Kak’s protocol, we will introduce a modification which allows
for greater security against man in the middle attacks. In addition, we introduce a
new single stage protocol which similarly allows for security against such attacks.
2. Quantum Key Distribution
The usefulness of quantum key distribution lies in the properties of the qubit,
the quantum unit of information. Since a qubit is an object representing a quantum
superposition state, the qubit cannot be copied. This is commonly called the no-
cloning theorem [3]. This property ensures that during qubit data transmission, it
is impossible for an evesedropper (Eve) to simply make copies of the qubits being
sent, and thus manipulate these copied qubits to obtain the message. This useful
property allows quantum data transmission to be used effectively in key distribution
protocols as shown in [3].
When a private key can be transmitted securly along a quantum channel, then
secure classical communication between the two parties (Alice and Bob) can be
achieved using the private key (Figure 1). One private key cryptosystem in use
today is the Vernam cipher, also called the one time pad. According to Nielsen and
Chuang, the security of the private key used in the Vernam cipher is sometimes
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ensured by transmitting it via such low-tech solutions as clandestine meetings or
trusted couriers. The need for better transmission protocols is obvious.
Figure 1. Quantum Key Distribution
3. Kak’s Three-Stage Protocol
In [4], S. Kak proposed a new quantum key distribution protocol based on secret
unitary transformations (Figure 2). His protocol, like BB84, has three stages, but
unlike BB84, it remains quantum across all three stages. In the first stage, Alice
manipulates the message X , which is simply one of two orthogonal stages (e.g.
α|0〉+ β|1〉 and β|0〉 −α|1〉) by means of a unitary transformation UA, known only
to her. Bob receives the new state, and in the second stage, applies his own secret
transformation UB, which is both a unitary transformation, and one that commutes
with UA, and sends the result back to Alice. In the third stage, Alice applies the
Hermitian conjugate of her transformation, U †A, and sends the result back to Bob.
Since U †AUBUA(X) = UB(X), Bob simply applies U
†
B and obtains the previously
unknown state, X .
4. The Man in the Middle Attack
The Suceptability of both BB84 and Kak’s three-stage protocol to man in the
middle attacks has been documented [e.g. 5,6], and various methods to counter
these attacks have been proposed [e.g. 7,8]. In such an attack, the eavesdropper,
Eve, can attempt to thwart the communication between Alice and Bob in one of
the following ways (Figure 3).
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Figure 2. Kak’s Three-Stage Protocol
(1) Eve receives the message from Alice by impersonating Bob. Eve then de-
codes Alice’s message, and, now impersonating Alice, duplicates this mes-
sage to Bob. In this scenerio, both Eve and Bob obtain the secret message.
(2) Eve impersonates Bob and decodes Alice’s message as in scenerio 1, but
instead of relaying the actual message to Bob, Eve relays a different message
of her own choosing. In this scenerio, only Eve obtains the secret message.
(3) Eve impersonates Bob, but is not able to decode Alice’s message. Instead,
she impersonates Alice and sends her own message to Bob. In this scenerio,
communication between Alice and Bob is blocked, but no secret message is
comprimised.
Figure 3. Man in the Middle Attack
5. A Variation on Kak’s Three Stage Protocol
In Kak’s paper [4], he suggests using secret real valued orthogonal transforma-
tions to encrypt the qubits. Under orthogonal transformations of the same form
(see below), the selection of the angles θ and φ by Alice and Bob respectively does
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not affect the outcome of the protocol. Furthermore, both Alice and Bob do not
need to know what each other’s angle selection is.
The reason that a man in the middle attack can be carried out is that when
UA is assumed to be real valued, it is very easy for Eve to find another unitary
transformation, UE , which commutes with UA. This is the underlying assumption
by both Perkins [5], and Basuchowdhuri [7]. Indeed, for a 2x2 real valued unitary
transformation (i.e. an orthogonal transformation), there is a limitation on its form.
Consider a 2x2 transformation:
UA =
[
w x
y z
]
, w, x, y, z ∈ ℜ
Then, for UA to be orthogonal (unitary), UAUA = I. This gives rise to the following
equations: 

w2 + y2 = 1
x2 + z2 = 1
wx + yz = 0
These equations are satisfied only when UA has one of the two following forms:
U1(θ) =
[
cos(θ) −sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)
]
,
a rotation, as Kak proposed, or
U2(θ) =
[
cos(θ) sin(θ)
sin(θ) −cos(θ)
]
,
a reflection across the line θ2 .
The three-stage protocol demands that while Bob doesn’t know the value of θ
that Alice is using, he must know which of the two above forms of UA that Alice
chooses. The reason for this is that while U1(θ) commutes with U1(φ) for any θ
and φ, and U2(θ) commutes with U2(φ) for any θ and φ, U1(θ) does not commute
with U2(φ) in general. So we will consider the choice of the form of UA to be public
information. Once this information is known, Bob simply needs to choose his own
angle φ, and his transformation UB will be of the same form as UA.
UB =
{
U1(φ), UA = U1(θ)
U2(φ), UA = U2(θ)
.
It is easy to see that when the same form is used, UA and UB commute (i.e.
UAUB = UBUA).
For Form 1:
UAUB =
[
cos(θ) −sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)
] [
cos(φ) −sin(φ)
sin(φ) cos(φ)
]
=
[
cos(θ)cos(φ) − sin(θ)sin(φ) −cos(θ)sin(φ) − cos(φ)sin(θ)
cos(φ)sin(θ) + cos(θ)sin(φ) −sin(θ)sin(φ) + cos(θ)cos(φ)
]
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Applying trigonometric identities,
UAUB =
[
cos(θ + φ) −sin(θ + φ)
sin(θ + φ) cos(θ + φ)
]
.
Since UA and UB have the same form, it is clear that they commute.
For form 2:
UAUB =
[
cos(θ) sin(θ)
sin(θ) −cos(θ)
] [
cos(φ) sin(φ)
sin(φ) −cos(φ)
]
=
[
cos(θ)cos(φ) + sin(θ)sin(φ) cos(θ)sin(φ) − cos(φ)sin(θ)
cos(φ)sin(θ) − cos(θ)sin(φ) sin(θ)sin(φ) + cos(θ)cos(φ)
]
.
Again, applying trigonometric identities,
UAUB =
[
cos(θ + φ) sin(φ− θ)
sin(θ − φ) cos(θ + φ)
]
Since UA and UB always commute given the same form, then for Eve to imper-
sonate Bob and obtain Alice’s secret message, she only needs to select any angle
ψ and use it in her own transformation UE where UE is of the same form as UA.
Using UE , Eve can obtain the secret state X in the exact same way that Bob can
obtain it. In addition, Eve can relay a message to Bob using her own UE transfor-
mation. Since Bob doesn’t know what Alice’s UA transformation is, Eve’s UE is a
valid substitution.
Suppose now instead of a orthogonal (i.e. unitary and real value) transformation,
Alice chooses a more general complex valued unitary transformation,
UA(θ) =
1√
2
[
eiθ e−iθ
ieiθ −ie−iθ
]
, θ ∈ [0, 2pi).
When Alice chooses a UA of this form, it is more difficult for Bob to find another
transform, UB which commutes. We see that when
UB(φ) =
1√
2
[
eiφ e−iφ
ieiφ −ie−iφ
]
, θ ∈ [0, 2pi),
then
UAUB =
[
ei(θ+φ) + iei(φ−θ) ei(θ−φ) − ie−i(θ+φ)
iei(θ+φ) + ei(φ−θ) iei(θ−φ) − e−i(θ+φ)
]
and
UBUA =
[
ei(φ+θ) + iei(θ−φ) ei(φ−θ) − ie−i(φ+θ)
iei(φ+θ) + ei(θ−φ) iei(φ−θ) − e−i(φ+θ)
]
.
These transformations commute only when φ = θ + pi (or any 2pi multiple). For
Bob to decode Alice’s message, he must have more information than simply the
form of her transformation. He must know also the value of θ that she has chosen.
While this might seem to be a hindrence to the protocol, it allows for much
greater security against a man in the middle attack. Eve attempts to intercept
Alice’s message to Bob by choosing a UE to impersonate Bob’s UB. As we saw
earlier, when UA is real valued, Eve can simply pick any angle ψ and generate a
transformation UE that commutes. But with a complex valued UA, Eve cannot
guarantee a commuting transformation without knowing the value of θ. Consider
Eve’s choice of a ψ without knowledge of θ. Then, U †AUEUA 6= UE .
6 JAMES HAROLD THOMAS
6. The Single Stage Quantum Cryptography Protocol
When, as in the variation to Kak’s protocol described above, Bob knows the
value of θ that Alice has chosen for her transformation UA (assuming as above that
the form of UA is public information), then he has full knowledge of UA. In this
situation, Alice and Bob can forego the second two stages of the protocol and let
Bob perform the transform U †A to obtain the unknown state X (Figure 4). We have
simply, U †AUA(X) = X . In this situation, there is no need for UA to be complex
valued. We can have, as Kak proposed in [4],
UA =
[
cos(θ) −sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)
]
So for Eve to intercept the message X and properly decode it, she would have
to know the value of θ. The strength of this protocol is dependent on keeping
the value of θ a secret known only to Alice and Bob. We enhance the security of
our protocol by allowing for θ to change, which blocks any attempt by Eve at a
statistical analysis of the qubits. We assume that before secure transmission may
begin, there is some other secure protocol that Alice may use to transmit her initial
value of θ to Bob. One example is Perkins’ protocol which uses trusted certificates
[6].
Suppose we restrict θ to the upper half plane of the unit circle. After l qubits are
successfully transmitted from Alice to Bob, the qubits l+1 to l+ k will be used to
obtain the new value of θ. The k data bits selected by Alice for these k qubits will
represent an integer N such that if bn is the nth bit transmitted (bn ∈ {0, 1}), then
N = bl+1+2bl+2+4bl+3+ ...+2
kbl+k. When these four qubits are received by Bob
and decoded, Alice and Bob adjust their transformations UA and U
†
A respectively
such that
UA =
[
cos(θN ) −sin(θN)
sin(θN) cos(θN )
]
, θN =
Npi
2k
.
After this, Alice transmits l more qubits to Bob before again changing the value
of θ. In this fashion, any attempt by Eve to obtain the value of θ with no prior
knowledge would be extremely difficult.
Figure 4. The Single Stage Quantum Cryptography Protocol
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Figure 5. Framing on the Single Stage Protocol
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